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ABSTRACT 
 
We empirically examine the determinants of the decision whether or not to appoint an expatriate as the 
managing director of overseas affiliates for a sample of 844 Japanese manufacturing affiliates 
operating in Asia in 1995. Confirmation is found for hypotheses based on a control & coordination 
perspective on expatriation as well as a knowledge creation & learning perspective. Information 
interdependence and strategic interdependence between affiliate and parent increase the propensity to 
appoint expatriates, while localization of the affiliate reduces it. Organizational experience in the 
country, both of the affiliate and the firm, increases the probability that host country nationals are 
appointed. Inter-firm relationships within vertical keiretsu groups impact expatriation policies through 
inter-organizational information sharing in host countries and the mitigation of localization 
requirements due to intra-group transactions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The question of whether an expatriate should run a firm's foreign affiliates or not has – directly or 
indirectly - been a topic of management research for the past twenty-five years (see, for example, 
Tung, 1982; Kobrin, 1988; Boyacigiller, 1990; Sohn, 1994; Banai, 1995; Wang, Wee & Koh, 1998; 
Downes & Thomas, 2000). Edström and Galbraith (1977) were among the first to categorize the 
reasons for transferring personnel abroad. In their classic Administrative Science Quarterly article they 
distinguished between three motives: i) filling positions, ii) management development and iii) 
organization development. Each of these motives provides different reasons for employing either 
parent country nationals (PCN) or host country nationals (HCN). When conceptually examining the 
reasons behind the expatriation decision, two strands of research appear to have developed rather 
independently of each other (Delios & Björkman, 2000). On the one hand there are studies that use a 
control and coordination framework to explain the choice between a PCN and HCN (e.g. Boyacigiller, 
1990; Kumar & Seth, 1998; Wang, Wee & Koh, 1998; O’Donnell, 2000). These operate on the 
assumption that the parent seeks ways to align the affiliate’s objectives with its own and that the use of 
expatriates is one way to control operations abroad. On the other hand there are studies that apply a 
perspective rooted in knowledge creation and learning (e.g. Downes & Thomas, 2000). These start 
from the premise that the organization and the expatriate are both bases of knowledge that by means of 
learning develop the competitive position of the organization. Both perspectives will be analyzed in 
this paper.  
Empirical research on the determinants of executive staffing practices is still relatively scarce 
(Harzing, 2001). Furthermore, with the exception of Delios and Björkman (2000), the few studies that 
have been conducted did predominantly limit analysis to expatriation in US multinationals (Downes 
and Thomas, 2000) or to expatriation practices in a single firm (Boyacigiller, 1990). Given the 
potential impact of the top manager on the functioning of the affiliate this lack of empirical attention 
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seems surprising.1  
In this context, executive staffing decisions in Japanese multinational firms are an especially 
interesting case to examine. Japanese multinational firms make extensive use of expatriates for top 
management positions in their overseas affiliates (Rodgers and Wong, 1996; Belderbos 1997, 1998). A 
recent survey among foreign owned affiliates in Asia indicates that Japanese firms' reliance on PCNs 
is still continuing and substantially greater than in US and in German firms (MITI, 2000). Whereas the 
US and German firms predominantly rely on local executives, in more than 70 percent of Japanese 
affiliates the executives were Japanese expatriates.2 The intensive use of expatriates in Japanese 
multinationals has been linked to the specific human resource management practices in Japanese firms 
such as life time employment systems, extensive job transfer systems, seniority based pay, and an 
emphasis on control through socialization (McMillan, 1996; Tung, 1984; Beechler and Yang, 1994; 
Jaeger and Baliga, 1985), and the tacit nature of knowledge and best practice transfer in Japanese 
firms such as total quality control systems and JIT procedures (e.g. Wilkinson et al, 1994; Rodgers and 
Wong, 1996). It is also a corollary of the exceptionally low failure rate of Japanese expatriate 
assignments (Briscoe 1995, Peterson et al, 1996). On the other hand, it has been pointed out that this 
form of ethnocentric staffing policy has its drawbacks, such as creating a ceiling for the promotion of 
host country managers and increasing turnover among talented host country employees (e.g. Negandhi 
et al, 1985; Banai, 1995; Tung, 1984, Beamish and Inkpen, 1998). Moreover, it has been suggested 
that this organizational practice is also rooted in negative perceptions of foreign nationals among 
Japanese managers and therefore difficult to change even if management of overseas affiliates would 
be more effective through the appointment of host country nationals in managerial positions (Banai, 
1995). In this paper, we examine to what extent decisions on expatriate appointments by Japanese 
firms are explained by firm and affiliate characteristics in a way predicted by perceived theories of 
expatriation, rather than being an artifact of organizational inertia.3 
 
 
1 See Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) for an overview of the impact of top management on the functioning of 
the organization. 
2 The reported percentage in a study by Harzing (2001) was only somewhat lower (62,5%). 
3 In this sense, we follow Beechler and Yang (1996) by framing our working hypotheses in the tradition of the 
'HRM fit school' or contingency approach to the transfer of Japanese HRM practices: Japanese HRM practices 
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A major institutional characteristic of Japanese firms affecting human resource management 
practices is the importance of inter-firm ties within vertical Japanese industrial groups or vertical 
keiretsu. Vertical keiretsu are networks of suppliers, related or spin-off manufacturers, and wholesale 
and retail distributors grouped around major large-scale assembly manufacturers such as Toyota in the 
car industry, or Hitachi and Matsushita in the electronics industry. A characteristic of vertical groups 
is that the leading or 'core' firm exerts a degree of management control over other member firms, 
facilitated by shareholdings, financial ties (intra-group loans) and the dispatch of managers (e.g. 
Belderbos, 1997; Gerlach, 1992, Goto, 1982). A particular feature of vertical groups is that the internal 
labor market of the 'core' firm and job transfer systems extend to other group firms: managers of the 
core firm are on a regular basis dispatched to group firms (Odagiri, 1992). Previous studies on 
internationalization and keiretsu ties have shown that existing group ties are to an important extent 
replicated abroad (Martin et al 1995, 1998). Keiretsu group linkages have been found to influence the 
decision to set up manufacturing plants abroad (Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1996), the location of 
such foreign manufacturing investments (Head et al 1995, Belderbos and Carree, 2002), and 
procurement practices of overseas affiliates (Belderbos et al, 2001). In this paper we examine whether 
ties to vertical business groups and group characteristics abroad also influence human resource 
management practices and the decision to use expatriates or local managers for executive positions. 
Summarizing, the contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we apply an integrated 
framework based on a control and coordination as well as a knowledge creation perspective to analyze 
executive staffing decisions. Specifically, we focus on the determinants of the decision to appoint an 
expatriate parent country national (PCN) or a host country national (HCN) as the managing director of 
foreign manufacturing affiliates. Second, we contribute an empirical analysis of expatriation in a large 
sample of Japanese multinational firms, using a unique dataset on 844 Japanese manufacturing 
affiliates in eight different Asian countries. Third, our analysis not only examines the influence of the 
 
will be transferred abroad to a foreign affiliate or adapted to local conditions depending on the environment and 
strategic positioning of the affiliate. 
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parent firm, the affiliate, and environmental characteristics on expatriate appointments, but also the 
role of inter-organizational interdependence within Japanese vertical business groups, or keiretsu.4 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides further detail 
on the background to Japanese human resource management practices and the role of vertical business 
groups. The paper then discusses the two theoretical perspectives on expatriation and develops 
hypotheses based on these views and the specific setting in which Japanese firms operate. Section four 
discusses the methodology and describes characteristics of the dataset and the operational measures. In 
section five the results are presented and the final section provides a discussion of these results and 
offers recommendations for future research.  
 
 
HRM AND EXPATRIATION IN JAPANESE FIRMS  
 
In this section we review the literature on Japanese HRM an expatriation practices and the 
potential role of inter-firm linkages in business groups. Japanese (human resource) management 
practices have been described as centering around a number of core concepts: articulated management 
philosophy, corporate culture and a trust based internal labor market (e.g. McMillan, 1996, Beechler 
and Yang, 1996; Odagiri, 1992). This internal labor market involves careful selection of managerial 
candidates, life time employment systems, seniority based pay, frequent job rotation of career workers 
and managers, and substantial investments in employee training. This system of management and 
organization, with strong lateral communication between managers of different business units and 
functional departments allows for an important emphasis on cultural control in the management of 
domestic and overseas operations (Baliga and Jaeger, 1985; Ouchi, 1980). Cultural control systems 
imply that output is controlled by shared norms, that behavior is guided by the shared philosophy of 
management, and that performance is not necessarily imposed by an external control system since 
employees and managers see this as a social obligation (Jaeger and Baliga, 1985; Ouchi, 1980). These 
 
4 Although Boyacigiller (1990) suggested that such inter-company linkages should be taken into account in 
future research, this issue has not yet received due attention. 
 6 
Determinants of Expatriation 
company specific control systems are partly rooted in Japanese culture emphasizing trust, loyalty, and 
group identification. Since cultural and language barriers impose important obstacles to the transfer of 
such control systems abroad and to the involvement of host country nationals, Japanese firms have 
relied on expatriates to manage foreign affiliates and to serve as a conduit between headquarters and 
the local organization. The specific traits of Japanese management and organizational practices also 
form the basis of the extraordinary success of expatriate assignments by Japanese multinational firms. 
Compared to US and European multinational firms, Japanese firms excel in careful selection of 
expatriates, pre-assignment training and preparation, more intensive support from headquarters during 
the assignment, allowing longer assignments and time to learn, and careful career management and 
repatriation policies (Peterson et al, 1996; Tung, 1984).  
 Another particular feature of Japanese management and organization that influences HRM 
policies in particular for career mangers is the intensive inter-organizational linkages within vertically 
organized industrial groups centered around major manufacturers such as Hitachi, or Toyota (e.g. 
Goto, 1982, Belderbos, 1997; Gerlach, 1992).5 Dependent firms in the group in most cases have an 
intensive trading relationship (either as a supplier or as a client) with the core manufacturer and may 
be partly owned or financed by the core firm.6 The most important feature of this organization 
involving HRM practices is that the internal labor market extends to group members in vertical 
groups. Part of the job rotation schemes of managerial workers involves posts at suppliers or other 
group firms. Through posting of managers, the core firm maintains a level of control over the group 
firms, often complemented by (minority) equity stakes and loans. Such managerial postings foster 
intra-group inter-firm communication, aiding joint development programs for new products, 
coordination on just in time delivery systems and other processes necessitating inter-organizational 
information exchange. Sako (1999) argues that intra-group job rotation schemes should be seen as a 
 
 
5 A second major category of business groups, horizontal keiretsu, are large bank-centered and trading firm-
centered diversified groups of basically independent firms (Nakatani, 1984; Goto, 1982). Here group firms are 
not an extension of internal labor markets and there is no evidence of group influences on HRM practices. We 
abstract from horizontal groups in this paper. 
6 This organization is also the result of a 'hive off' strategy by large industrial firms, establishing individual 
divisions into separate firms. For instance, Nippondenso one of the largest car component manufacturers in the 
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means to diffuse skills and tacit knowledge of managers and employees, which would otherwise be 
hard to transfer through market mechanisms. Odagiri (1992) notes that transfer of managers to group 
firms is a common practice in large Japanese firms leading vertical business groups. Statistics show 
that among large Japanese firms, 90 percent had employees working in other companies, while on 
average 17 percent of managers of large firms were transferred to other firms. Sako (1996) finds that 
up to 25 member firms in the Toyota group have employees formerly working for Toyota on the board 
of directors. To the extent that this system of managerial postings across groups firms is replicated 
and/or adapted abroad, this form of inter-firm interdependence is also likely to influences overseas 
HRM practices and expatriate assignment decisions. 
Empirical work on the transfer of Japanese management and organizational practices has 
mainly focused on the transfer of Japanese organizational 'best' practices for manufacturing such as 
Just In Time delivery systems, total quality control systems, flexible equipment retooling, and HRM 
practices such as enterprise unions, team work, open job descriptions, etc. The results paint a mixed 
picture. Nohria and Rozenzweig (1994) find that HRM practices (such as training, working times, 
participation in decision making) in US affiliates of Japanese firms are significantly less localized than 
such practices in EU and Canadian firms' affiliates. Analysis revealed that the presence of expatriates 
reduced the degree of localization. Rodgers and Wong (1996) find that the transfer of Japanese 
organizational practices such as quality control and responsiveness to production problems enhances 
the performance of affiliates and that such transfer is facilitated by the presence of expatriate managers 
in Singaporean affiliates. Specific HRM practices such as seniority based pay and enterprise based 
unions on the other hand, were generally not transferred. Beechler and Yang (1996) in a case study of 
five Japanese affiliates in the US, find that the transfer of HRM practices is positively dependent on 
the strategic importance of the affiliate and argue that the HRM practices adopted will be based on the 
fit with the environment and strategic role, as suggested by Boyacigiller (1990). Delios and Björkman 
(2000) is the only study focusing on expatriate staffing policies in Japanese subsidiaries abroad. They 
analyze differences in the total number of expatriates employed in Japanese subsidiaries, rather than 
 
 
world, was originally spun off from Toyota (Odagiri, 1992). Toyota maintains a minority share holding in the 
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expatriation policies for managing directors, and focus on comparing affiliates in China (PRC) and the 
United States. They find that the use of expatriation differed in these two countries, with higher 
expatriate use in China than in the United States. Affiliate and parent characteristic also impact the 
number of expatriates, with greater ownership stakes and larger size of the affiliates leading to more 
expatriation, but with lower expatriation levels observed for firms with greater international 
operations.7 
In this paper we follow the contingency approach in analyzing the decisions to appoint 
expatriates to the position of managing director of Japanese affiliates abroad. Although the particular 
characteristics of Japanese HRM practices explain the general higher propensity to appoint expatriates 
as managing directors of overseas affiliates, they do not explain the instances that firms do appoint 
host country nationals to head overseas operations. Our contention is that the expatriation decision 
differs systematically across firms and affiliates depending on their characteristics. The nature of these 
systematic relationships follows from received theories and perspectives on expatriation, but is also 
affected by inter-firm relationships within business groups that are a more particular trait of Japanese 
firms. 
 
 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO EXPATRIATION 
 
In this section we develop hypotheses concerning the factors determining expatriate 
appointments for managing directors in overseas affiliates from a control and coordination perspective 
as well as in the context of a knowledge and learning framework. Furthermore, the influence of inter-
firm ties within vertical Japanese industrial groups is discussed.  
 
 
firm. 
7 Mixed results were obtained for the impact of subsidiary age and the role of previous experience of the parent 
firm in the country. 
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A control and coordination perspective on expatriation 
From a control and coordination perspective, the appointment of a PCN managing director to 
an affiliate helps ensure that the way the affiliate is managed is in line with the interest of the parent 
company (Geringer & Frayne, 1990; Wang, Wee & Koh, 1998). The PCN is in this case used to fill a 
position (Edström & Galbraith, 1977 and 1994). The PCN can thus either be considered as a means of 
headquarters supervision or as a mechanism of social control (O’Donnell, 2000). The most important 
theories within the control and coordination perspective providing explanations for the use of 
expatriate top managers are agency theory, structural contingency theory and the resource dependency 
perspective (Kumar & Seth, 1998). 
Structural contingency theory looks at the expatriate staffing decisions from an information 
processing perspective (Boyacigiller, 1990; and Kumar & Seth, 1998). In this view the affiliate and the 
parent are both part of the same information processing network, implying that the type of 
coordination and control varies with the required information processing. If the information needs of 
the affiliate and the parent are independent of each other, the assignment of a PCN seems redundant. 
If, however, the sharing of information between affiliate and parent is necessary for successful 
functioning, the assignment of a PCN to facilitate this interdependent information flow seems more 
likely (Killing, 1983). This generates a first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: As the information interdependence between affiliate and parent increases, the 
likelihood that a PCN will be assigned as managing director of the affiliate 
will increase.  
 
 Agency theory defines the choice between the assignment of a PCN or a HCN as the trade-off 
between the cost for headquarters of monitoring the behavior of the affiliate by using a PCN versus the 
cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the affiliate by assigning a HCN (Eisenhardt, 
1985). The determinants of this choice can be found in the level of goal incongruence and information 
asymmetry between parent and affiliate (Kren & Liao, 1988; and Zajac, 1990). The assignment of a 
PCN to directly supervise foreign operations reduces goal incongruence and information asymmetry to 
 10 
Determinants of Expatriation 
a certain extent. When, however, operations of the affiliate become too specialized and thus the 
information required to monitor too extensive (and too costly), direct supervision as a control 
mechanism needs to be substituted by measuring outputs. Decentralization of decision-making occurs 
and the affiliate is granted more discretion with respect to dealing with the local market (Egeloff, 
1988). This makes the assignment of a HCN as managing director more appropriate. This is 
summarized in hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2: As the local orientation of the affiliate increases, the likelihood that a PCN will be 
assigned as managing director of the affiliate will decrease. 
 
The resource dependence perspective, finally, looks at expatriate staffing in terms of a parental 
mechanism to gain influence or power over the critical resources of the affiliate (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). The central question in this approach is how dependent the parent is on the resources of the 
affiliate to execute its own strategy successfully. The more the parent depends on these resources, the 
more careful it will manage this relationship and the larger the likelihood that a PCN is assigned as 
managing director of the affiliate. This leads to the third hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  As the strategic interdependence between affiliate and parent increases, the 
likelihood that a PCN will be assigned as managing director of the affiliate 
will increase. 
 
 
A knowledge creation and learning perspective on expatriation 
From a perspective of knowledge creation and learning the objective of the parent when 
assigning a PCN as managing director is to develop managers by means of foreign experience or- even 
one step further - to develop the organization so that a knowledge network is created through 
expatriation (Edström & Galbraith, 1977 and 1994; Scullion, 1991; and Bonache & Cervino, 1997). 
The importance of such a perspective for the achievement of a sustainable competitive advantage, has 
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received a lot of recent research attention (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). The organization is viewed as a 
knowledge base in which knowledge is created, stored and applied (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; and 
Grant, 1996). The role of the PCN then becomes to act as a depot of knowledge, which enables the 
transfer of intellectual capital between the different affiliates and the parent (Bird, 1996). Specifically, 
two flows of knowledge can be distinguished. There is a flow of organization-specific knowledge 
from the parent to the affiliate and there is a flow of market- or country-specific knowledge flowing 
from the affiliate back to the parent. To what extent knowledge transfer and learning actually takes 
places depends on the absorptive capacity of both the parent and the affiliate. Absorptive capacity is 
defined as the ability to “recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990:128). This capacity is influenced by the extent of related 
prior knowledge and the extent to which parent and affiliate are similar with respect to certain 
attributes (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). In this reasoning knowledge creation benefits most when 
parent and affiliate share a similar frame of reference. This bears strong resemblance to the findings 
with respect to increased learning when firms have similar prior knowledge, compatible norms and 
values and similar operational priorities or ‘dominant logic’ (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Lane, Salk and 
Lyles, 2001). The implication is that when the affiliate has no experience in working with the parent 
firm and is thus not familiar with the existing corporate routines of the parent, interaction at the level 
of the individual becomes necessary to permit the transfer, recombination, and creation of knowledge 
(Grant, 1996). The assignment of a PCN then facilitates the creation of the necessary common frame 
of reference. On the other hand, when previous experience in the country has been obtained, the 
organization has had the opportunity to learn from these experiences and develop organizational 
routines and to develop an existing body of social knowledge (Sohn, 1994; Downes & Thomas, 2000; 
Delios and Björkman, 2000). This makes the assignment of a PCN as a means of knowledge transfer, 
in particular the transfer of market specific knowledge flowing from the affiliate to the parent, less 
necessary. This generates the following two hypotheses.  
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Hypothesis4:  The greater the affiliate’s experience in cooperating with the parent firm, the 
lower the likelihood that a PCN will be assigned as managing director of the 
affiliate. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  The greater the prior experience of the parent in the country, the lower the 
likelihood that a PCN will be assigned as managing director of the affiliate. 
 
 
Expatriation and the role of inter-firm ties within a vertical keiretsu 
Inter-organizational ties within vertical business groups and the characteristics of those groups 
can influence expatriate appointment policies in several ways. First, a large network of operations 
established by other group firms in a host country promotes sharing of relevant country-specific 
information and lateral rather than vertical information exchange (Belderbos & Sleuwaegen, 1996; 
Martin et al, 1998). According to the information processing view in the control and coordination 
perspective on expatriation, the information interdependence of the parent and the affiliate decreases, 
making the appointment of a PCN as managing director less necessary. Furthermore, in line with the 
knowledge creation and learning perspective, the presence of a large number of group affiliates will be 
associated with the existence of a group-wide knowledge base with market- and country specific 
knowledge, reducing the benefits of PCN appointments. Third, a larger network of group affiliates in 
the country may allow affiliates to draw from a larger pool of local HCN managers with relevant 
management experience and skills, both through intra-group transfers of managers and through 
management training programs sponsored by the 'core' firms.8 Group firms are likely to benefit from 
such training systems if their HCN managers take part in the schemes and benefit from intra-group 
management transfer practices if these are replicated abroad through the transfer of HCN managers 
possessing organizational skills and experience from 'core' firm affiliates to other group affiliates in 
the country. This relatively greater availability of HCN managers with the required skills and 
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experience reduces the likelihood that a PCN will be assigned. These considerations lead to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis6: As the size of the manufacturing network of the keiretsu in the country 
increases, the likelihood that a PCN will be assigned as managing director of 
the affiliate decreases. 
 
A contrasting aspect of the role of local keiretsu affiliate networks is that keiretsu firms replicate 
existing supplier and distribution relationships in the host country, reducing the exposure to the host 
country environment (Martin et al, 1995; 1998, Belderbos et al, 2001). The larger the network, the 
more likely it is that procurement and sales transactions occur within the network as a replication of 
supplier and client relationships in Japan. In case the vertical group has established a large interrelated 
network of affiliates in a host country, a local orientation implies that local relationships are 
predominantly with other firms in the keiretsu network and not with local firms. The consequence is 
that there will be a reduced genuine localization and reduced emphasis on output control, as well as 
greater intra-group informational dependence, increasing the need to assign a PCN as managing 
director.  
 
Hypothesis 7: As the local orientation of the affiliate is predominantly geared towards intra-
keiretsu sales, the likelihood that a PCN will be assigned as managing 
director of the affiliate will increase. 
 
 
 
8 For instance, Toyota recently started such a formal training program for its foreign management executives. 
See "Global Executives Wanted at Toyota", Nikkei Weekly, 13 October 2000. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
 
Data collection and sample 
Our dataset draws on a detailed and complete list of Japanese manufacturing affiliates in Asia 
in the broadly defined electronics industry compiled by Denshi Keizai Kenkyujo in Tokyo and 
published as Asia Shinshutsu Denshi Maker (Electronics Manufacturing Firms in Asia). This is an 
authoritative source on Japanese foreign investments in Asia with complete coverage of investments 
by both large and small and medium sized firms. The data source covers 1129 manufacturing affiliates 
set up by 438 Japanese parent firms operational in 1995 in nine Asian countries (South Korea, Taiwan, 
China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand). The investments give 
a reliable picture of both leading electronics firms and smaller group-related or unrelated suppliers 
along the value chain of the electronics industry. The restriction of the analysis to one industry, while 
potentially limiting the generalizability of the results, allows us to focus accurately on parent and 
affiliate characteristics impacting expatriation policies while abstracting from influences across 
industries. The database contains information on the affiliates’ paid-in capital, number of employees, 
the managing director, name and equity stake of the Japanese investor, direction of sales, and products 
manufactured. We limited analysis to those affiliates for which complete information was available on 
the dependent and independent variables. In particular, the percentage of sales destined for the local or 
Japanese market was not always reported. In total 844 affiliates could be included in the empirical 
analysis.9 The 844 affiliates include 303 affiliates established by the large industrial keiretsu groups in 
the electronics industry such as Matsushita, Sanyo, Toshiba, Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, Mitsubishi 
Electric, and the Seiko group. Of these, 193 were set up by the 'core' firm of the group while the others 
were established by related firms within the group. In 69,5 percent of the affiliates (587 cases), the 
managing director was an expatriate parent country national. 
 
 
9 The distribution over countries for the 884 affiliates sample was similar to that of the full sample, neither did 
averages for other variables significantly differ, such that sample selection bias is not expected to affect the 
empirical results. 
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Operational measures 
The dependent variable, expatriate managing director, is a binary variable taking the value one 
if the managing director of the affiliate is a parent country national, and zero otherwise.10 Information 
interdependence is measured by the affiliate’s share of exports back to Japan in total sales. When the 
affiliate exports back to Japan, the parent company has to provide feedback information on technical 
requirements, required quality levels and marketing conditions. Knowledge of product specifications, 
distribution systems, and clients are crucial to penetrate the Japanese market successfully and the 
parent can play a major role in providing this through exchange of information with the affiliate. The 
ability of the parent to provide this information and therewith the intensity of information exchange 
will depend on its marketing capabilities and distribution network in Japan.11 Although we cannot 
directly measure the role of the parent firms investments in marketing and distribution, the capability 
to fund these investments are closely correlated with firm size. Hence, we expect small and medium 
size firms (SMEs), defined as firms with less than 500 employees in Japan to be less able to provide 
crucial information to overseas affiliates than larger firms. We therefore include sales to Japan 
separately for SMEs and for non-SMEs and expect a larger positive impact of the latter on expatriate 
appointments. Local orientation of the affiliate is measured in terms of share of affiliate sales destined 
for the local (host country) market. If an affiliate produces for local customers only, knowledge of the 
local market becomes far more important than when the affiliate’s customers are predominantly 
international. A local sales orientation implies a higher degree of localization and intensive interaction 
with the host country, pushing for the appointment of host country nationals to managerial positions.12 
Experience of the affiliate in cooperating with the parent firm is captured by the number of years that 
the affiliate has been in operation since startup until 1995, or in case of acquisitions, the number of 
 
10 We could not identify third country national appointments as a third type of executive staffing policy. Such 
appointments, however, are almost non-existent in Japanese multinationals. Tung (1982) reports no third country 
national appointments while Peterson et al (1996) reported very limited use of this type of staffing policies in 
their respective samples of Japanese multinationals. 
11 The role of parent firm operations is demonstrated by the fact that a dominant share of Japanese electronics 
affiliates back to Japan are intra-firm sales (MITI, 1997). 
12 The close integration between Hong Kong affiliates and manufacturing affiliate operations in Guangdong 
(PRC) often blurs the distinction between Hong Kong and PRC sales and makes ‘local’ sales often more difficult 
to determine than the sum of Hong Kong and PRC sales. We therefore treated sales in China and Hong Kong 
both as local for Hong Kong and China affiliates.  
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years since the Japanese firm acquired a stake in the affiliate.13 Country experience of parent is 
measured by the number of years that other affiliates of the parent had been operating in the specific 
country prior to the establishment of the affiliate. Both experience variables are hypothesized to have a 
negative sign. Strategic interdependence is measured by two operational variables: the equity position 
of the parent and the relative size of the affiliate. The equity position of the parent represents the 
commitment of resources from the parent to the affiliate. The higher the equity position, the more 
resource commitment, the more strategic interdependence (Blodgett, 1991; and Torbiörn, 1994). An 
additional dimension of strategic interdependence, once controlled for equity stake, is the relative size 
of the affiliate. The greater this relative size, the greater the influence of affiliate performance on the 
performance of the firm and the greater the strategic importance of the affiliate.14 Relative size is 
measured as the ratio of the number of employees of the affiliate over the number of employees of the 
parent firm. We expect separate positive impacts of both variables. 
The size of the local keiretsu network is measured as the number of affiliates operated by 
firms in the same vertical keiretsu in the country of establishment of the affiliate. A negative impact on 
PCN appointments is expected. The second keiretsu variable moderates the earlier hypothesized effect 
of localization (local sales) on the appointment of PCNs. For keiretsu affiliates that are part of a large 
network of manufacturing plants set up by group firms in the country, local sales are more likely to be 
intra-group rather than to local firms and distributors. The primary purpose of investments in 
manufacturing networks is often to replicate existing intra-group supplier-customer relationships 
abroad, leading to strong keiretsu plant agglomerations in host economies and intra-group sales and 
 
13 The database contains information on the year of investment (the year the parent acquired the affiliate in case 
of acquisitions), allowing us to measure the effective years of affiliate-parent operating experience. The data do 
not allow us to further identify which affiliates were acquired, but in practice Japanese acquisitions in the Asian 
electronics industry are very rare. Belderbos et al. (2001) only find 3 cases of acquisitions in a sample of 190 
Japanese electronics affiliates in Asia drawn from a survey by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI).  
14 We treat these different dimensions of strategic interdependence as potentially having separate additive 
impacts on expatriation policies, rather than extracting a principal component. The correlation between the two 
variables is slightly negative due to the fact that smaller equity stakes are more common in large overseas 
affiliates and in affiliates of SMEs with fewer financial resources. Our specification test whether, given the 
equity position, relative size has an additional impact.  
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procurement patterns.15 The implication is that a local sales orientation requires limited localization by 
keiretsu firms, such that for keiretsu firms local sales is expected to have a smaller negative effect on 
the appointment of PCNs compared to independent firms. We include the interaction effect of the 
number of keiretsu affiliates in the country and the local sales ratio to test this influence and expect a 
positive impact on expatriate appointments. 
 In addition to the above operational measures, we include as control variables eight country 
dummies (with Thailand as the reference country). A number of country specific factors are likely to 
impact on the decision to appoint a PCN or HCN: the availability of local experienced managers, the 
wages of such managers relative to those of expatriate Japanese, the cultural distance from Japan, and 
formal regulations or informal government pressure to promote host country nationals to managerial 
positions (Boyacigiller, 1990). A description and summary statistics of the dependent and explanatory 
variables are provided in Table 1 and the appendix contains a table with correlation coefficients. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Statistical method 
Since the dependent variable, expatriate (PCN) managing director, is binary, an appropriate 
econometric specification is the logit model, which relates the probability of expatriate assignment to a 
set of explanatory variables : X
 
(1)   
)exp(1
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XPCN βα
βα
++
+==  
 
 
 
15 E.g. Belderbos and Carree (2002), Martin et al (1995, 1998). Similarly, Belderbos et al (2001) find evidence of 
high intra-keiretsu procurement of parts and components in host countries with agglomerations of Japanese 
manufacturing plants. 
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RESULTS 
 
We present the results of the logit model explaining of the decision to assign a PCN as 
managing director to overseas affiliates in Table 2. Overall the empirical model performs well: it is 
highly significant with a pseudo R-square of 0.32, which is quite respectable for logit models. The 
percentage of correct predictions is 66 percent if sample probability threshold levels of 0.305 (HCN) 
and 0.695 (PCN) are used (i.e. if a ‘correct’ prediction is defined as a predicted probability greater 
than the sample probability). Furthermore, all significant coefficients have the hypothesized sign. 
Hypothesis 1, predicting a positive relationship between information interdependence and the 
assignment of a PCN, is partly confirmed. Sales to Japan as an indicator of information 
interdependence has a positive and significant impact on PCN appointments in larger Japanese parent 
firms. For SMEs (firms with fewer than 500 employees) this is not the case: sales to Japan has a 
negative sign but is not significantly different from zero. Firms with larger operations in Japan 
including larger scale distribution and marketing activities are likely to provide extensive information 
on specifications and quality levels to Asian affiliates, and this information interdependence is better 
facilitate through expatriate directors. Affiliates of SMEs, on the other hand, are less dependent on 
information coming from headquarters.16 Hypothesis 2 is confirmed by a negative and significant 
impact of the local sales ratio (localization) on PCN appointments. Hypotheses 3 and 4, predicting 
negative impacts of operating experience of the affiliate and previous operating experience of the 
parent in the country on PCN appointments, are both confirmed by the negative and significant 
coefficients of affiliate experience and parent previous country experience. This provides strong 
confirmation of the knowledge perspective on expatriation. The positive relationship between strategic 
interdependence and the assignment of a PCN (Hypothesis 5) also finds support in the results. The 
equity stake of the parent is positive and strongly significant, while the relative size of the affiliate has 
an additional positive impact, with the coefficient significant at the 10 percent level (Note that we 
 
16 An alternative specification with the interaction effect of employees in Japan and the sales to Japan ratio was 
similarly positive and significant at the 10 percent level. 
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use conservative two-tailed significance tests throughout. Hypothesis 6, predicting a negative 
relationship between the number of firms belonging to the keiretsu group in the country and the 
assignment of a PCN, is supported by the negative and significant impact of the keiretsu affiliate 
count. The interaction effect of the keiretsu affiliate count and the local sales ratio, on the other hand, 
is positive and significant. This confirms hypothesis 7 predicting a positive moderating impact of the 
size of the keiretsu network in the country on the effect of the local sales ratio. The estimated 
coefficients imply that with the presence of more than four keiretsu affiliates the positive local sales 
effect is absent, suggesting a relatively strong difference in the importance of localization for keiretsu 
and non-keiretsu firms. On the other hand, even for keiretsu affiliates with only local sales, the total 
effect of an increase in the number of keiretsu group plants remains negative, indicating that `local 
vertical keiretsu networks on the whole facilitate the appointment of HCN to management positions. 
 The estimated coefficients for the country dummy variables show that affiliates in South 
Korea, Taiwan, and China (PRC) have a significantly lower probability of an expatriate managing 
director than the reference country Thailand. In South Korea and Taiwan the availability of 
experienced local managers in the electronics industry will facilitate HCN appointments. Another 
factor of potential importance is the fact that Japan also has historical economic relationships and past 
colonial ties with Taiwan and South Korea, making local business and managers more familiar with 
Japanese language and business practices.17 In China, intense price competition from other 
multinationals and local Chinese firms combined with the high additional cost of sending in 
expatriates has put strong pressure on Japanese firms to localize management.18  
 
 
17 In addition, North East China has once been a colony of Japan (Manchuria). Belderbos and Carree (2002) find 
a relatively strong agglomeration of Japanese affiliates in this part of China, in particular the Dalian area. 
18 E.g. “Japan firms slow to promote locals”, Nikkei Weekly, 25 March 2002. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper analyzed the determinants of expatriate appointments to the post of managing 
director of overseas manufacturing affiliates for a sample of 844 Japanese electronics affiliates in nine 
Asian countries. It developed hypotheses on the impact of characteristics of parent firms and affiliates 
based on two broad perspectives on expatriation identified in the literature: a control and coordination 
perspective, and a knowledge creation and learning framework. From a control & coordination 
perspective, the empirical results of a logit model explaining the appointment of expatriates as 
managing directors of overseas affiliates confirmed that expatriate appointments are more often 
chosen if the affiliate is less localized, more dependent on information from Japan, and of greater 
strategic importance to the investing firm. From a knowledge creation perspective, greater experience 
both at the affiliate level and by the parent at the country level was found to facilitate more host 
country national appointments to the post of managing director. These results suggest that the two 
perspectives on expatriation play a complementary role in explaining expatriation decisions. 
 Our analysis took into account a specific characteristic of Japanese firm organization and 
management: the importance of inter-firm ties within vertical business groups (keiretsu) centred 
around large electronics manufacturers such as Matsushita, Toshiba, and Hitachi. The empirical results 
suggest that both intra-group supplier-client relationships as well as practices of information exchange 
and intra-group managerial postings are transferred abroad once the group has build up a critical 
presence in the host country. On the one hand, a greater group presence in the host country facilitates 
host country national appointments to the post of managing director, which may be due to intra-group 
exchange of information and experiences, as well as group wide training programs for local managers. 
On the other hand, a strong reliance on intra-group sales transactions in the host country mitigates 
localization requirements for group firms and hence makes expatriate appointments more attractive. 
The former effect is stronger than the latter, indicating that vertical keiretsu networks on the whole 
facilitate the appointment of local managers to the position of managing director.  
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 Overall the results confirm that Japanese firms do not simply follow an ethnocentric approach 
to overseas managerial appointment decisions and the transfer of Japanese HRM practices, but rather a 
contingency approach (cf. Beechler and Yang, 1996; Delios and Björkman, 2002): Japanese firms 
adapt expatriation policies depending on the strategic role of the affiliate, the type of information 
flows, the experience of the parent firm, as well as the nature of inter-firm ties in vertical business 
groups. The results for affiliate and country experience may indicate that the particular reliance of 
Japanese firms on expatriate managers could reduce over time as Japanese multinational firms gain 
more international experience.19 However, the question is whether such a reliance on gradual 
organizational development is enough, given the degree of ‘catching up’ that Japanese firms need to 
do in reducing reliance on expatriate managers (MITI, 2000), and the greater need to access local 
talent to fill overseas managerial positions for firms with rapidly growing affiliate networks. In 
particular in China, reports and surveys indicate that the reliance by Japanese firms on expatriates 
negatively impacts competitiveness of their operations by increasing costs and hampering the ability to 
attract able local managers because of negative perceptions on promotion possibilities.20 In response, 
several leading Japanese firms, among which Toyota, have recently implemented global executive 
training systems aimed at promoting local managers to executive positions in affiliates.21 Clearly, 
attracting and motivating capable local host country managers remains a major future concern for the 
expansion and competitiveness of Japanese multinational firms abroad. 
 This paper contributed to the scarce empirical literature on the determinants of expatriation. 
The results on the importance of inter-firm ties within vertical business groups are consistent with the 
prediction of Boyacigiller (1990) that the determinants of expatriation choices are not only firm-
specific, but also depend on inter-firm ties in business groups. This may not only hold specifically for 
Japanese firms, but could also affect human resource strategies of multinational firms from other 
 
19 There is some emerging evidence that the strong reliance on expatriate managers by Japanese firms is indeed 
declining (Beamish and Inkpen, 1998). 
20 Several reports on Japanese firms’ operations in Asia allude to the high costs and inflexibility associated with 
a reliance on expatriate managers. E.g. “Sony employs color purple to motivate China plant workers”, Nikkei 
Weekly, 10 March 2003; “Japanese firms slow to promote locals, Nikkei Weekly, 25 March 2002. A survey by 
the Japan Bank of International Cooperation found that “securing local managers” was the most important 
management concern for Japanese affiliates operating in China. 
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countries, in particular those firms that established manufacturing operations abroad mainly in 
rseponse to the internationalisation of their existing industrial customers. Future research could 
investigate to what extent inter-firm ties impact expatriation policies in multinational firms from other 
countries. Also, there is a need for complementary case study evidence investigating the precise nature 
of inter-firm linkages affecting expatriation decisions, such as the roles of management transfers and 
training, information exchange, and sales relationships. A further avenue for future work would be a 
replication of the current analysis to more recent managerial appointment decisions to investigate to 
what extent Japanese multinational firm have become more responsive to the need to access local 
managerial talent. Finally, it has been suggested that the lack of policies to advance local managers to 
executive positions in overseas affiliates may negatively affect the performance of Japanese 
multinational firms (Beamish and Inkpen, 1998). An important contribution in the field could come 
from an empirical investigation of affiliate performance and the relationship with expatriation policies. 
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Description of Variables 
 
Variable    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Description Mean st.dev.
Expatriate Managing Director 
Binary variable (0,1) with value 1 if the managing director of the affiliate is a 
parent country national 0,70 0,46 
Sales to Japan ratio (SMEs) 
Share of sales to Japan in total sales of the affiliate, for SMEs (parent firms 
with less than 500 employees in Japan) 0,08 0,22
Sales to Japan ratio (non-SMEs) Share of sales to Japan in total sales of the affiliate, for non-SMEs 0,09 0,25
Local sales ratio Share of host country sales in total sales of the affiliate 0,52 0,44
Affiliate experience Number of years since the start of operations of the affiliate 9,42 7,84
Parent Prior country experience 
Number of years that the parent has operated a manufacturing affiliate in the 
country before the establishment of the current affiliate 1,76 4,69
Equity stake of parent in the affiliate Equity stake of the parent firm in the affiliate 0,72 0,28
Relative size of affiliate Ratio of affiliate employees over employees of the Japanese parent firm 1,71 9,00 
Vertical keiretsu affiliates in country 
Number of manufacturing affiliates of the keiretsu group other than those of 
the parent firm in the country (in case the parent firm belongs to vertical 
keiretsu) 1,65 4,23
Local sales ratio * number of keiretsu affiliates 
 
Interaction effect of local sales ratio and keiretsu manufacturing affiliates 
 
1,01 3,58
South Korea Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the affiliate is located in South Korea 0,10 0,30
China (PRC) Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the affiliate is located in PRC 0,24 0,42
Hong Kong Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the affiliate is located in Hong Kong 0,05 0,21
Malaysia Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the affiliate is located in Malaysia 0,20 0,40
Taiwan Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the affiliate is located in Taiwan 0,13 0,33
Philippines Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the affiliate is located in the Philippines 0,03 0,17
Indonesia Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the affiliate is located in Indonesia 0,05 0,21
Singapore Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the affiliate is located in Singapore 0,11 0,31
 30 
Determinants of Expatriation 
 
Table 2. Logit Analysis: Determinants of the Probability of Assigning an Expatriate as 
Managing Director 
 
Variable 
Hypothesis: 
expected sign Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  
Sales to Japan ratio (SMEs) H1: + -0,47 0,50  
Sales to Japan ratio (non-SMEs) H1: + 1,17 0,54 ** 
Local sales ratio H2: - -0,62 0,31 ** 
Affiliate experience H3: - -0,05 0,01 ** 
Parent prior country experience H4: - -0,06 0,02 *** 
Equity stake of parent in the affiliate H5: + 2,84 0,37 *** 
Relative size of affiliate H5: + 0,07 0,04 * 
Vertical keiretsu affiliates in country H6: - -0,23 0,05 *** 
Local sales ratio * number of keiretsu affiliates H7: + 0,19 0,06 *** 
     
Constant and country dummies:     
South Korea  -2,85 0,48 *** 
China (PRC)  -2,63 0,46 *** 
Hong Kong  -0,61 0,69  
Malaysia  -0,42 0,49  
Taiwan  -1,58 0,47 *** 
Philippines  -1,18 0,72  
Indonesia  -0,83 0,63  
Singapore  0,38 0,56  
Constant  1,46 0,58 ** 
     
Number of observations   844  
Likelihood ratio Test: Chi-square (17)   314,07 *** 
Pseudo R-square   0,32  
Percentage of correct predictions   66  
 
Notes: The reference country is Thailand. Note: *, **,*** = significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively 
(two-sided tests) 
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Appendix: Correlation Coefficients 
 No 1                 
                
               
              
             
            
           
          
         
        
       
      
     
        
         
  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17  
Expatriate Managing Director 1 1,00  
Sales to Japan ratio (SMEs) 2 0,02 1,00  
Sales to Japan ratio (non-SMEs) 3 0,13 -0,13 1,00  
Local sales ratio 4 -0,25 -0,27 -0,35 1,00  
Affiliate experience 5 -0,07 -0,08 -0,02 -0,06 1,00  
Parent prior country experience 6 -0,08 
 
-0,07 
 
-0,05 
 
0,01 -0,10 1,00 
 
 
Equity stake of parent in the affiliate 7 0,40 0,05 0,08 -0,29 -0,05 -0,05 1,00  
Relative size of affiliate 8 0,08 0,03 -0,05 
 
-0,06 
 
-0,04 -0,05 -0,09 1,00  
Vertical keiretsu affiliates in country 9 -0,20 -0,12 0,00 0,07 -0,09 0,13 -0,14 -0,06 1,00  
Local sales ratio * number of keiretsu affiliates 10 -0,18 -0,10 -0,07 0,26 -0,14 0,07 -0,16 -0,04 0,86 1,00  
South Korea 11 -0,27 0,01 -0,04 0,17 0,15 -0,01 -0,15 -0,05 -0,11 -0,08 1,00  
China (PRC) 
 
12 -0,25 
 
0,05 -0,01 
 
0,17 -0,41 
 
-0,06 -0,14 
 
0,00 0,18 0,25 -0,19 1,00 
 
 
Hong Kong 13 0,10 0,04 0,02 -0,06 0,07 -0,01
 
0,14 -0,01
 
 -0,04
 
-0,05 -0,07 -0,12 1,00 
 
 
Malaysia 14 0,19 -0,01 -0,01 -0,14 -0,11 0,05 0,15 0,04 0,03 -0,03 -0,17 -0,28 -0,11 1,00  
Taiwan 15 -0,08 -0,02 0,01 0,03 0,41 -0,04 -0,03 -0,06 -0,04 -0,03 -0,13 -0,21 -0,09 -0,19 1,00  
Philippines 16 0,05 0,08 0,02 -0,09 -0,01 -0,02 0,05 -0,01 -0,07 -0,05 -0,06 -0,10 -0,04 -0,09 -0,07 1,00   
Indonesia 17 0,06 -0,05 -0,05 -0,05 -0,08 -0,02 0,00 0,12 -0,05 -0,05 -0,07 -0,12 -0,05 -0,11 -0,08 -0,04 1,00  
Singapore 
 
18 0,16 
 
-0,07 
 
-0,07 
 
-0,02 
 
0,15 
 
0,07 
 
0,07 
 
0,00 
 
-0,01 
 
-0,05 
 
-0,12 
 
-0,20 
 
-0,08 
 
-0,18 
 
-0,14 
 
-0,06 
 
-0,08 
 
1,00 
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